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The aesthetic turn
This paper considers alternative styles of philoso-phy, based on art or science, through an investi-gation of Rudolf Carnap and Martin Heidegger. 
Carnap’s criticism of Heidegger’s account of das Nichts 
is analysed in relation to Immanuel Kant’s theory of 
the imagination. Heidegger’s account of the work of 
art demonstrates philosophies that take science as 
their model, over-emphasize cognition, and do not ad-
equately consider the importance of apprehension.
In 1946, Paul Tillich published a seminal essay 
entitled ‘The two types of philosophy of religion’ in 
which he maintained that every philosophy of reli-
gion developed in the Christian tradition takes one 
of two forms. While Alfred North Whitehead once 
suggested that everyone is born either a Platonist or 
an Aristotelian, Tillich argues that every philosophy 
of religion is either Augustinian or Thomistic – the 
former he labels the ontological type, the latter the 
cosmological type. The distinction between the two 
types of philosophy of religion is based on the dif-
ferences between the two classical arguments for the 
existence of God; that is to say, the ontological and 
cosmological arguments. 
While the details of Tillich’s argument need not 
concern us here, it is instructive to note that the dif-
ference between the ontological and cosmologic al 
types roughly corresponds to the conventional dis-
tinction between continental and analytic phil osophy 
respectively. Instead of recycling the tired distinction 
between Anglo-American and continental philoso-
phy, it is more helpful to contrast two styles of phi-
losophising: one that models itself on art and one 
that models itself on an interpretation of science. This 
way of posing the issue is deliberately provocative, 
because it suggests that there is nothing outside or 
beyond style. Art and style, in turn, are inseparable – 
there is no art without style and no style without art. 
The distinction, I am suggesting, is not hard-and-fast. 
Just as there is a religious dimension to all culture, so 
there is an artistic dimension to all creative thinking; 
and just as religion is often most significant where it is 
least obvious, so style is often most influential where 
it remains unnoticed, and often denied. The choice, 
then, is not between style and non-style but between 
a style that represses its artistic and aesthetic aspects, 
and a style that explicitly expresses them. In order to 
explore the differences between these two alterna-
tives, I begin by examining the debate between two 
philosophers whose work has played a crucial role 
in framing the debate for almost a century: Rudolf 
Carnap and Martin Heidegger. 
In 1929, Heidegger and Carnap published brief 
texts that proved decisive for later twentieth-century 
philosophy. Carnap and his colleagues Hans Hahn 
and Otto Neurath issued a document that is widely 
acknowledged to be the manifesto of the Vienna 
Circle, entitled ‘The scientific conception of the 
world: the Vienna Circle’, and Heidegger delivered 
his inaugural lecture at the University of Freiburg – 
‘What is metaphysics?’ Both Carnap and Heidegger 
called for the overcoming of metaphysics, but their 
reasons and their intentions could not have been 
more different. For Carnap, the abstractions and com-
plexities of speculative metaphysics were vacuous as 
well as socio-politically suspect. He insisted that clar-
ity and simplicity are the necessary characteristics 
of truth. Philosophy can only enter the modern era 
by appropriating what he described as a scientific 
method of investigation and empirical procedures 
for verification. For Heidegger, by contrast, modern 
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science and technology, which are the culmination 
of what he labels the western ‘ontotheological trad-
ition’, pose a threat to human life as well as the future 
of the planet. The only way to avert impending dis-
aster is to develop a thoroughgoing critique of their 
pernicious effects by recovering philosophy’s orig-
inal relationship to art. Three years after Heidegger’s 
lecture, Carnap responded in an article entitled ‘The 
elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis 
of language’. The significance of these two essays far 
surpasses the initial exchange. Heidegger and Carnap 
present contrasting positions that have implicitly and 
explicitly shaped philosophical debate for decades.
Heidegger approaches his questioning of meta-
physics from an unexpected direction by discussing 
the role of science in shaping the modern university: 
‘What happens to us, essentially, in the grounds of our 
existence, when science becomes our passion?’ Far 
from a method of disinterested investigation cap able 
of establishing objective truth, science, Heidegger 
maintains, is a product of the western metaphysic al 
tradition that has been characterized by a perni-
cious ‘forgetting of being’. He argues, ‘Today only 
the technical organization of universities and facul-
ties consolidates this burgeoning multiplicity of dis-
ciplines; practical establishment of goals by each dis-
cipline provides the only meaningful source of unity. 
Nonetheless, the rootedness of the sciences in their 
essential ground has atrophied’ (Heidegger 1977: 96). 
For Heidegger, the ‘essential ground’ science forgets is 
being itself. Rather than disinterested, science’s pre-
occupation with beings is an extension of Nietzsche’s 
will to power in ‘the will to mastery’ through which 
‘man’ (sic) seeks to ‘secure to himself what is most 
properly his’. Within this scheme, the scientific attitude 
rests on two basic principles: representation and utili-
tarianism. When truth collapses into certainty with 
Descartes’s turn to the subject, everything becomes a 
‘standing-reserve’, or resource, programmed to serve 
human ends, and through his domination man finally 
seems to be at home in a world where everything is 
manageable. But at precisely this moment of appar-
ent triumph, humankind’s fortunes are reversed. 
Through an unexpected turn, the exercise of the will 
to power unleashes what Hegel, describing the reign 
of terror following the French Revolution, had called 
‘the fury of destruction’, which ultimately destroys the 
world and with it humanity.
The most effective way to avoid the all-consum-
ing abyss opened by modern science and technology, 
Heidegger argues, is to turn towards a no less dis-
turbing abyss that is buried deep in the ever-receding 
past. He devotes his entire philosophical enterprise 
to questioning what science forgets, ignores or even 
represses. He names this elusive remainder das Nichts 
(the) nothing. While science is preoccupied solely 
with ‘beings and beyond that – nothing’, Heidegger 
asks, ‘What about this nothing?’
What precisely ‘is’ this nothing? This question 
obviously negates itself in its very formulation. One 
cannot say what nothing is without making it some-
thing. That is why Heidegger never asks the ques-
tion directly; rather, he asks indirectly, ‘How is it 
with nothing?’ Nothing cannot be objectified, rep-
resented or manipulated; it is never given yet always 
gives whatever is and is not. Nothing is apprehended, 
which is not to say comprehended (I will return to 
this distinction in what follows), in moods like dis-
traction, boredom and above all anxiety. While fear 
always has a specific object, anxiety reveals noth-
ing ‘in the slipping away of beings… We “hover” in 
anxiety. More precisely, anxiety leaves us hanging 
because it induces the slipping away of beings as a 
whole’ (Heidegger 1977: 103). This void in the midst 
of whatever appears to be present renders all beings 
uncanny and undercuts the very possibility of com-
plete knowledge and reasonable control. Where sci-
ence sees causes that ground determinate entities, 
Heidegger glimpses the groundless ground – der 
Abgrund – from which everything emerges and to 
which all returns through a process he labels ‘nihil-
ation’. From Heidegger’s point of view, the entities 
that science investigates and technology manipulates 
are neither self-contained nor self-grounded; to the 
contrary, they emerge from nothing, which, while 
never present, is not absent. Nihilating nothing clears 
the space that allows differences to be articulated 
and identities to be established even if never secured. 
Truth, Heidegger maintains, does not involve the 
correspondence between word and thing, idea and 
object, representation and fact or signifier and signi-
fied; it is the primordial opening (Aletheia) between 
and among beings and entities that is the condition 
of the possibility of all forms of correspondence. As 
such, truth can be neither represented nor compre-
hended clearly and precisely, but is revealed in the 
elusive ambiguity of art. 
Carnap confidently declares all such speculation 
meaningless nonsense. The goal of the Vienna Circle 
was ‘to set philosophy upon the sure path to science’. 
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Logical positivism rests on two fundamental prin-
ciples: 1) the strict adherence to the scientific method, 
which entails a rigorous empiricism; 2) the insistence 
that all problems can be solved by logical and linguis-
tic analysis. Absolutely convinced of the validity of 
their method, Carnap and his colleagues go so far as 
to proclaim, ‘The scientific world-conception knows 
no unsolvable riddle’ (Carnap et al. 1996: 306–7). For 
science and philosophy to reach the lofty goal of total 
knowledge, they must free themselves from theology 
and metaphysics by dismantling traditional ways of 
thinking through a critical analysis of the language.
Though the details of analysis differ, variations 
of this philosophical approach share five important 
assumptions, several of the most important of which 
can be traced to medieval nominalist theology.
1. Meaningful linguistic claims are cognitive. This 
is not to imply that language is deployed in no 
other ways. It can, for example, be used to express 
intentions and feelings. Meaning, however, can 
only be determined by logical analysis and ‘the 
reduction to the simplest statements about the 
empirically given’.
2. Meaningful statements are referential, that is, they 
refer to actual entities, events or states of affairs. 
A. J. Ayre points out that for logical positivists 
‘the meaning of a proposition is its method of 
verification. The assumption behind this slogan 
is that everything that could be said at all could 
be expressed in terms of elementary statements. 
All statements of a higher order, including the 
most abstract scientific hypotheses, were in the 
end nothing more than shorthand descriptions of 
observable facts’. This verification requires ‘intro-
spectible or sensory experiences’ (Ayre 1959: 13, 
17).
3. Meaningful statements are representational. Words 
and statements re-present objective facts to the 
cognitive subject.
4. Scientific and philosophical analysis presupposes 
logical/linguistic and ontological atomism. State-
ments are meaningful only insofar as ‘they say 
what would be said by affirming certain elemen-
tary statements and denying certain others, that 
is, only insofar as they give a true or false picture 
of the ultimate “atomic” facts’ (Ayre).
5. Rigorous analysis reduces complexity to simplic-
ity. This method of analysis privileges simplic-
ity over complexity; more precisely, critical 
analysis reduces complex phenomena to their 
simple parts. For Carnap and those who share 
his faith, the task of philosophy at the end of 
metaphysics is largely negative. The application 
of scientific method to philosophical analysis 
‘serves to elimin ate meaningless words, meaning-
less pseudo-statements’ (Carnap 1959: 77). Any 
extension beyond critical and regulative analysis 
cannot be justified in terms of logical positivism’s 
foundational principles.
From this point of view, the claims of metaphys-
ics and theology, he argues, are ‘pseudo-statements’ 
that are ‘entirely meaningless’. Since the word ‘God’, 
for instance, refers to something beyond experience 
and is, therefore, ‘deliberately divested of its refer-
ence to a physical being or to a spiritual being that is 
immanent in the physical’, it is inescapably meaning-
less (Carnap 1959: 66). Most of the other important 
terms used by metaphysicians and theologians, for 
example, the Idea, the Absolute, the Unconditioned, 
the Infinite, essence, the I, and so forth, are similarly 
disqualified. To support his argument, Carnap turns 
to what he describes as the ‘metaphysical school, 
which at present exerts the strongest influence in 
Germany’, which he, he claims, is best exemplified by 
Heidegger’s essay, ‘What is metaphysics?’
Carnap concentrates his criticisms on two sen-
tences: ‘The Nothing nothings’, and ‘The nothing 
only exists because…’. In the first sentence, Heidegger 
makes two mistakes: first, he uses the word ‘nothing’ 
as a noun, when ‘it is customary in ordinary lan-
guage to use it in this form in order to construct a 
negative existential sentence’; and second, he makes 
up a meaningless word ‘to nothing’ (in the previous 
translation, ‘to nihilate’). Far worse than attempting 
to extend the meaning through metaphorical use, 
Heidegger creates a new word that has no meaning. 
The second sentence, Carnap insists, is simply self-
contradictory – to say that nothing exists – regardless 
of how this is understood – is nonsensical. 
To understand the stakes of these arguments, it 
is important to recall that during the first decades 
of the twentieth century, Vienna was a hotbed of 
modernism: art (Gustav Klimt, Oskar Kokoschka 
and the Secessionists), music (Arnold Schoenberg), 
psychoanalysis (Sigmund Freud), and architecture 
9Approaching Religion • Vol. 6, No. 2 • December 2016 
(Otto Wagner, Camillo Sitte and Adolf Loss). Here 
as elsewhere in Europe, there were two conflicting 
strands of modernism, which bear a resemblance to 
the contrasting philosophical styles of Carnap and 
Heidegger. On the one hand, modern artists, and 
especially architects, appropriated modern science 
and technology to develop an aesthetic committed to 
rationality, clarity, transparency, utility and function-
alism; on the other hand writers and artists, draw-
ing on the work of Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Richard Wagner, sought to fathom the 
irrational depths of human subjectivity in works that 
were deliberately obscure, polyvalent, and function-
ally useless. The most influential representative of 
the latter tendency is Klimt, whose paintings express 
Freud’s eroticizing of the personality, and, by exten-
sion, culture. This rationalist trajectory leads to the 
purportedly styleless style of Walter Gropius, Mies 
van der Rohe, and their colleagues at the Bauhaus. 
Allergic to complexity and infatuated by simplic-
ity, minimalist philosophers echo their architectural 
counterparts by quietly repeating the mantra ‘less is 
more’. When considered in this context, the differ-
ence between scientific philosophy and art becomes 
fuzzy. The issue is not so much art versus non-art 
but two different aesthetics, which entail contrasting 
attitudes toward life. From logical positivism to ana-
lytic philosophy, the aestheticization of philosophy is 
affirmed in the very effort to deny it. The straight lines 
and right angles of black-and-white pages reflect and 
are reflected by the minimalism of facades stripped 
of ornamentation to expose straight lines and right 
angles made of glass and steel.
Philosophy, architecture, and art devoted to the 
principles of simplicity, purity, clarity and trans-
parency, are distinctively modern and as such are 
outdated. In his influential work, Complexity and 
Contradiction in Architecture (1966), Robert Venturi, 
who famously recast Mies van der Rohe’s dictum 
‘less is more’ as ‘less is a bore’, might well have been 
commenting on philosophy rather than architecture 
when he wrote, 
Architects can no longer afford to be intimi-
dated by the puritanically moral language of 
orthodox Modern architecture. I like elements 
which are hybrid rather than ‘pure,’ compro-
mising rather than ‘clean,’ distorted rather than 
‘straightforward,’ ambiguous rather than ‘articu-
lated,’ perverse as well as impersonal, boring as 
well as ‘interesting’ conventional rather than 
‘designed,’ accommodating rather than exclud-
ing, redundant rather than simple, vestigial as 
well as innovating, inconsistent and equivocal 
rather than direct and clear. I am for messy 
vitality over obvious unity. 
For Venturi, style is explicitly substance and sub-
stance is style. Rejecting every variety of formalism 
and all minimalism designed to reduce complex 
wholes to ostensibly simple parts, Venturi proposes 
an aesthetic that cultivates the contradictions that 
transform the work of art into an endless process as 
well as a finished product. Rather than stripping away 
images to reveal foundational structures, Venturi 
proposes the endless proliferation of images of other 
images. The site of this shift is Las Vegas. The shift 
from modernism to postmodernism marks an aes-
thetic turn that repeats and extends an earlier aes-
thetic turn whose far-reaching implications have not 
yet been understood.
Throughout the history of western philosophy 
and theology, religion has been alternatively associ-
ated with cognition (thinking), volition (willing) 
and affection (feeling or affect). During the eight-
eenth century, many defenders and critics inter-
preted religious claims as primarily cognitive, that 
is to say, they viewed them as statements about the 
truth or falsity of the existence or non-existence of 
God, understood theistically or deistically, as well 
as about human existence and events in the world. 
To defend religious beliefs during a time when the 
modern scientific worldview was gaining influence, 
theologians and philosophers appropriated empiric al 
criteria of meaning and verification to recast the 
trad itional cosmological and teleological arguments 
for the existence of God. Starting from the evidence 
of the existence and design of the world apologists 
argued for God as its necessary cause. By the end of 
the eighteenth century, however, it had become clear 
that this strategy was ineffective because, as Hume 
demonstrated, the very empiricism used to defend 
belief actually undercut its foundation. If faith were 
to be rationally justified, some argued, its defence 
would have to be practical rather than theoretical. 
One of Kant’s primary motivations in his critical 
phil osophy was to develop a persuasive argument for 
religion within the limits of reason alone by recasting 
belief in terms of moral activity rather than scientific 
or quasi-scientific knowledge. But his analysis of the 
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relation between thinking and willing created more 
problems that it solved. Most important, the First 
and Second Critiques resulted in the unmediated 
oppositions between self and world, and subject and 
object, as well as the inner division between inclina-
tion and obligation. Kant recognized these problems 
and tried to solve them in the Third Critique, which 
explores aesthetic judgment. The central category 
in this work is ‘inner teleology’ or ‘purposiveness 
without purpose’, which is designed to move beyond 
the oppositional logic (i.e., either/or) of the first two 
Critiques, by proposing a dialectical logic (i.e., both/
and). The issue upon which the argument turns is the 
relationship between means and ends. In contrast to 
the external relation between means and ends char-
acteristic of utilitarianism and instrumentalization, 
Kant proposes a model in which means and ends are 
reciprocally related in such a way that neither can 
be apart from the other and each becomes itself in 
and through the other. Oppositional difference gives 
way to a complex structure of co-dependence and 
co-emergence. Kant gives two primary examples of 
purposelessness without purpose – one natural; the 
biological organism, the other cultural; the beauti-
ful work of art. More precisely, the organism and the 
beautiful work of art have no external purpose, but 
are self-reflexive. Within this structure, parts are not 
isolated particulars; rather, they are co-dependent 
members of a relational network or all-encompassing 
web. While this idea has proven to be revolutionary, 
Kant’s immediate successors thought he had failed 
to follow his argument to its logical conclusion, and, 
thus, ended up reintroducing the very oppositions 
he was attempting to overcome. After articulating a 
self-reflexive structure that transforms unmediated 
oppositions into dialectical interrelations, he quali-
fies his argument by insisting that the notion of inner 
teleology is merely a regulative idea that might or 
might not describe the world as such. 
During the following decade, his followers took 
the step Kant could not take by arguing that the 
self-reflexive structure of inner teleology is not only 
heuristically useful but is also ontologically real. It 
is the foundational structure of both thought and 
being. Different writers appropriated Kant’s idea for 
their own purposes: Hegel for his notion of spirit or 
the Absolute, Marx for his interpretation of capital, 
and, most important in this context, artists, writers 
and critics for the notion of ‘art for art’s sake’, which 
became normative for modernism. It is customary to 
understand post-Hegelian thought in terms of right-
wing and left-wing Hegelians. However, there would 
have been no Hegel without Kant, and just as there 
are at least two Hegels, so there are two Kants, which 
can be described as structural and post-structural 
Kantians. The question around which this distinction 
revolves is whether or not the self-reflexive structure 
of inner teleology is complete and all-encompassing, 
or incomplete and irreducibly open. If it is complete, 
the interpretive task is to reduce superstructure to the 
foundational infrastructure, which can be economic, 
social, psychological, or linguistic; if it is incomplete, 
the creative challenge is to expose the inherent faults 
in every system or structure through alternative 
strategies of indirect communication. 
Post-Kantian philosophy and art can be under-
stood in terms of these two alternatives: structural-
ists include thinkers and writers as different as G. W. 
H. Hegel, Émile Durkheim, Ferdinand de Saussure, 
and Claude Lévi-Strauss, Clement Greenberg, 
Henry Thoreau and T. S. Eliot; post-structuralists 
include thinkers and writers as different as Soren 
Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, 
Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Maurice Blanchot, 
Edgar Allan Poe, and Herman Melville. In order 
to explore the implications and possibilities of the 
inflection point which I have labelled the aesthetic 
turn, I will concentrate on Friedrich Schleiermacher’s 
Speeches on Religion to its Cultured Despisers (1799). 
I have chosen Schleiermacher because of the pivotal 
historical role he plays and also because his work is 
neither structuralist nor post-structuralist, but falls 
in between these two alternatives.
 Schleiermacher was among the group of influen-
tial figures who gathered in Jena in the 1790s. While 
all of these philosophers and writers were trans-
formed by the Third Critique, Schleiermacher was 
the only one who appropriated Kant’s interpretation 
of the beautiful work of art to develop an interpreta-
tion of religion in terms of feeling or affection rather 
than thinking or acting. There is, of course a close 
relationship of these faculties. Thought and action 
presuppose but cannot grasp intuition, from which 
they emerge. Intuition apprehends the primal unity 
that thinking processes. The elusive origin of thought 
is prior to the differentiation between subject and 
object, or self and world, and, therefore, cannot be 
comprehended. Schleiermacher explains, ‘You must 
know and listen to yourselves before your own con-
sciousness. At least be able to reconstruct from your 
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consciousness your own state… . What you are to 
notice is the rise of your own consciousness and not 
to reflect upon something already there. Your thought 
can only embrace what is sundered. Wherefore as 
soon as you have made any given definite activity of 
your soul an object of communication or contempla-
tion, you have already begun to separate’. Then he 
adds a very important qualification: ‘It is impossible, 
therefore, to adduce any definite example, for, as soon 
as anything is an example, what I wish to indicate is 
already past. Only the faintest trace of the original 
unit could be shown’. 
This remark makes it clear that the original unity 
from which everything emerges is never present, 
nor is it simply absent. It appears by disappearing, 
approaches by withdrawing, and, hence, is always 
already past, and yet, paradoxically, always yet to 
come. In other words, experience is always after that 
which makes it possible. In this context, ‘after’ must 
be understood in two ways, which imply a temporal 
ambiguity – after means both subsequent to, and in 
pursuit of. It should be clear that Schleiermacher’s 
primal unity is indistinguishable from Heidegger’s 
nothing, which is the condition of the possibility of 
every one and every thing. Just as Heidegger tries 
to represent the unrepresentable void from which 
(the) all emerges, so Schleiermacher tries to figure 
what is neither present nor absent, and, therefore, 
remains un-representable, through the imagin-
ation. He regards the imagination as ‘the highest and 
most original faculty in man’. For Schleiermacher, 
as for Nietzsche, the world is a work of art, and the 
human imagination is nothing less than the concrete 
embodi ment of the divine creative principle. Here, 
the work of art must be understood as both a verb 
and a noun – it is both a process and a product. Since 
human beings are agents of an encompassing cre-
ativity that acts through them, their works are ‘single 
fragments of this wondrous work of art’.
Though never formulated in precisely this way, 
Schleiermacher’s argument presupposes a distinc-
tion between comprehension and apprehension. 
‘Apprehension’ is a very suggestive word with multi-
ple meanings. It derives from the Latin apprehendere, 
which combines ad, meaning ‘to’, and prehendere, 
‘to seize’. ‘To apprehend’ means to take into cus-
tody, arrest; to grasp mentally; understand; as well 
as to anticipate with anxiety. ‘Apprehension’, which 
means a fearful or uneasy anticipation of the future; 
dread, implies an irreducible ambiguity that suggests 
both activity and passivity. While to apprehend 
means to grasp, apprehension is the result of being 
grasped by something that cannot be comprehended 
or controlled. Far from mere opposites, apprehen-
sion and comprehension are co-dependent and co-
emergent – each emerges in and through the other. 
Comprehension processes and programs appre-
hension, and apprehension disrupts and disturbs 
Fig. 1. The interplay of comprehension and apprehension 
both shapes and is shaped by so-called higher cognitive 
functions. 
Fig. 2. Cognitive processes.
S
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comprehension . Apprehension and comprehension 
overlap, but neither can be reduced to the other. 
The close relationship between comprehension 
and apprehension should not obscure the gap that 
remains between them. Affects can never be com-
pletely translated into concepts or words. This lin-
gering gap is the reason there are things that can be 
apprehended that cannot be comprehended. While 
cognitive comprehension processes and programs 
apprehension, there is always an excess or surplus, 
and this remainder is what the work of art is all about. 
When the work of art is not subservient to trad-
ition or intended to provide meaning, reassurance, or 
security, it cultivates apprehension by figuring what 
cannot be represented. If it is effective because it is 
affective, art solicits a response to what cannot be 
mastered or controlled; this is what makes it so dis-
turbing. Since the time of Kant, the unrepresentable 
has been figured in very different, and sometimes 
seemingly conflicting ways: Kierkegaard’s infinite 
and qualitative difference, Freud’s navel of the dream, 
Lacan’s real, Blanchot’s neuter, Georges Bataille’s 
sacred, Derrida’s ecriture, Julia Kristeva’s semiotic, 
Poe’s South Pole, Melville’s whale, Samuel Beckett’s 
Unnamable, and Virgina Woolf ’s waves. What unites 
these otherwise very different writers is their con-
trasting efforts to expose readers to the apprehension 
of what cannot be clearly and precisely articulated 
in language. Each writer uses language against lan-
guage to express what language cannot express. In 
this way, they all pursue what Jean-Luc Nancy and 
Phillip Lacoue-Labarthe aptly describe as ‘the literary 
absolute’. In their seminal book of that title, they trace 
the origin of the literary absolute to post-Kantian 
romantics: 
This is the reason romanticism implies some-
thing entirely new, the production of something 
entirely new. The romantics never really suc-
ceeded in naming this something: they speak 
of poetry, of the work, of the novel, or … of 
romanticism. In the end, they decide to call it 
… literature. … The absolute of literature is not 
so much poetry … as it is poiesy, according 
to an etymological appeal that the romantics 
do not fail to make. Poiesy or, in other words, 
production. …  Romantic poetry sets out to 
penetrate the essence of poiesy, in which the 
literary thing produces the truth of production 
in itself, and thus … the truth of the produc-
tion of itself, of auto-poiesy. And if it is true … 
that auto-production constitutes the ultimate 
instance and closure of the speculative absolute, 
then romantic thought involves not only the 
absolute of literature, but literature as the abso-
lute. Romanticism is the inauguration of the 
literary absolute. (Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe 
1988: 11–12)
 As I have suggested, during the 1790s major post-
Kantian writers took an aesthetic turn whose impli-
cations have yet to be realized. Art began to displace 
religion as the expression of human spiritual striving. 
Among poets and writers, this turn led to stylistic 
experiments designed to push language to its limits 
in an effort to figure the unfigurable. Leading post-
modern writers continue the struggle to articulate 
the literary absolute. There are, however, limits to this 
project and those limits have been reached. 
Philosophy is dead. Having long modelled itself 
on the natural and social sciences, philosophy has 
been supplanted by fields of scientific investigation 
such as cognitive science and neuroscience. Rather 
than expanding into new areas, philosophy has con-
tracted its focus to such an extent that it has virtu-
ally nothing to do with everyday life in contempor-
ary network society. Far too many philosophers are 
caught in an echo chamber where they hear only 
themselves and their like-minded colleagues chatter-
ing away about trivial issues. 
The way out of this self-reflexive loop is for phil-
osophy to take an Aesthetic Turn. There is, however, 
no reason that this pursuit needs to be limited to 
literature, language, and words; it can be extended 
to other media and artistic practices. If the real is 
beyond words, then perhaps it can be approached, or, 
more precisely, perhaps it can approach, not only in 
words, but also in works of art. 
For the past two decades, my wager, or one of my 
wagers, has been that the Aesthetic Turn opens new 
possibilities for the philosophical and what I have 
described as the a/theological imagination. In a series 
of books, I have sought to weave together words and 
images to expand the space of analysis and argument 
beyond straight lines, right angles, and black-and-
white. When this stylistic gesture proved insufficient, 
I took philosophy off the page and started creating 
art. Rather than a break with the philosophical trad-
ition, I regard these works of art as an alternative style 
of philosophical communication. In an age that reads 
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less and less, communication through images and 
figures that cannot be reduced to words might bring 
philosophy back to life. 
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